How does the current body of Thelemic work address questions of Ontology ?
What work needs to be done in order for Thelema (as a philosophic body of work) to fully address the current gaps in regards to questions of Ontology ?
Ontology has one basic question: "What is there?"
Here's a starting list of ontological questions we might expect Thelemic philosophers to answer:
(Mutilated and Ganked from Wikipedia)
1. What is existence?
2. Is existence a property?
3. What does it mean to say something does not exist?
4. Is existence properly a predicate?
5. Are sentences expressing the existence or non-existence of something properly called propositions?
6. What is a physical object?
7. Can one give an account of what it means to say that a physical object exists?
8. What constitutes the identity of an object?
9. When does an object go out of existence, as opposed to merely changing?
10. What features are the essential, as opposed to merely accidental, attributes of a given object?
11. What are an object's properties or relations and how are they related to the object itself?
12. What could it mean to say that non-physical objects (such as a time, souls) exist?
13. Why are we here?
14. Why does anything exist, rather than nothing?
If there are other ontological questions I've missed or if there is a better way to phrase a particular question than what is listed above, please point it out.
Lets discuss the possible answers to those questions from the Thelemic standpoint.
FWIW, I think as advocates of Thelema, we need to consider the entire body of Thelemic work from Rabelais to Dashwood to Crowley (and his contemporaries) and then on to modern day Thelemic philosophers / authors (from Crowley's death to the present day).
At some point, I'll set up a Wiki(pedia) style server to organize this better.